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Turning Around the Downward Spiral 
Of Economic, Social and Political Cohesion 
 
by Edmund Phelps* 
 
I will first pour out my thinking over the years on the social issues by way of 
background, then address cohesion and “turning around the downward spiral.”  
I began running into social questions fairly early in my career. 
A book I wrote over academic year ‘69-‘70 on unemployment observes that 
one’s job brings – beside the wage – “feelings of self-respect, esteem in the 
community, the sense of economic independence… and job satisfactions.”1 The 
book also refers to a “gain in the dignity of workers who catch…opportunities 
for the ‘better jobs’.” 
In that same academic year, it was my great fortune to be writing my book 
next door to John Rawls, who was writing his book on economic justice.2 I 
became a Rawlsian economist: A just economy is one in which the reward to the 
least advantaged participants is pulled up to the highest level feasible through 
taxes and subsidies. I contributed a 1973 paper deriving the optimum schedule of 
marginal tax rates on wage income in  
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a mathematical model to see what Rawlsian justice might entail.3 
My 1997 book Rewarding Work makes a broad case – safe streets, less drug 
addiction, children having examples at home as well as Rawlsian justice – for a 
graduated subsidy to firms for every full-time low-wage worker in their employ.4 
Also, the cost to the government is calculated. The subsidy has to taper off (for 
technical reasons) and that adds a lot to the cost.  
This employment subsidy was attacked by advocates of other programs in the 
late ‘90s. At an OECD Workshop in 1999, the wage subsidy plan was opposed 
by the American delegation as inferior to the earned income tax credit (EITC).5 
At a Cambridge conference in 1999-2000, Philippe van Parijs disparaged work-
based subsidies and tax credits in favor of the Universal Basic Income – the 
UBI.6 The preference for the EITC can be defended but the preference for UBI 
cannot be defended! It is anti-work and terribly far from being cost-effective.7 
In America, at any rate, this is not what people appear to have wanted: We 
Americans appear to want serious employment that will occupy us the better part 
of the day. Evidence: Since the ‘60s the workweek in manufacturing has showed 
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no downward trend.8 The total labor force participation rate has increased 
significantly since 1948.9 I also feel that Americans have a rapport with the 
underdog and a concern about economic justice in the rewards from work. 
What ought people to want in their economy? My book Mass Flourishing has 
an answer. While people need a just economy for their self-respect and national 
pride, they also want a good economy – an economy holding out expectations of 
a good life (or a life of “richness” as some humanists call it). That means, for one 
thing, the sense of succeeding  – as when your “ship comes in” (called 
“prospering”) or when you gain recognition.10 As humanists conceive it, the 
good life also means a kind of flourishing – using one’s imagination, exercising 
creativity, taking journeys into the unknown and acting on the world. 
In an op-ed last August, I asked what Americans do want. What is this thing 
called the American Dream?11 I contended that the Dream is not to own your 
own house. Nor win the lottery. Nor have higher income than your parents had.12 
Nor do I believe the Dream is largely to achieve things – building things, 
learning things, improving things. I contended that the core Dream is succeeding 
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at what is important to one. This dream of success may be related to the 
restlessness that some find in American literature.13 Americans are perhaps 
“restless” to find a place where they might succeed at something. (And another 
such place after that.) 
Now, how does this bear on “social and economic cohesion” and its 
“downward spiral”? Regarding this “cohesion,” the Panel Description helpfully 
refers to “growing inequalities” and “diversity” as well as “economic gaps” not 
addressed. I admire this portrait, but I would like to raise some questions and 
point to issues. 
The middle class has done relatively badly in recent decades while those 
among the top 1% (of earnings) have done alright. But many of these earners are 
new to the group, not among the old rich. And the middle class shouldn’t want 
society to close off opportunities for them to climb up the ladder. It may be that it 
is the slowdown of economic growth, most clearly that of labor incomes in the 
middle class – upper as well as lower – that has made the middle class 
discontent. 
It is true, I think, that the gap between the “working class” and people in the 
middle looks to be farther from a resolution than it was in, say, the ‘80s. The 
working class, or “lower middle class,” has grown more resentful as their wages 
have fallen almost to the wages of the poor.  
The displacement of many workers by new sorts of innovation in some 
industries – coal and manufacturing, perhaps also some other labor intensive 
industries – has left these workers with no alternative but to accept far worse-
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Goldman, “Americans, the Almost Chosen People,” Tablet, April 18, 2018. 
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paying jobs than they had occupied before or to leave the labor force and subsist 
on social insurance and social assistance. 
Relatedly, the slowdown of old sorts of innovation in much of the traditional 
parts of the economy – America (in the ‘70s), later France and then Britain – has 
impeded the absorption of those displaced workers by other industries in the 
traditional sector. I regard the slowdown story as no less important for 
understanding  than the displacement story. 
The continuing slowdown plus the new threat of mounting displacement of 
workers has led some to ask whether capitalism should be retained if its raison 
d’etre – the thrills of its grassroots dynamism as well as ever-rising living 
standards for all – continues to be largely lost. Of course, one hopes the West is a 
long way from drawing such a radical conclusion. 
What, then, is to be done? To gain or regain a Good Economy – an economy 
where participants can pursue a life of succeeding and flourishing as well as 
enjoying rising living standards – it will be NECESSARY to end the corporatism 
that grips Europe: the “social protection” from the ugly bosses (and rentiers) and 
the clientelism that favors giant firms and big banks through access to the state; it 
will also be NECESSARY to reform the Continent’s labor unions with their 
restraint of trade, change and innovation. 
But those reforms are not SUFFICIENT. There will have to be a profound 
change in society. Society must return to the modern values that once excited the 
West. To this end, it must restore the humanities to high school and university 
curricula. More broadly, it must do everything possible to instill all young people 
with the modern values of individualism (independence), vitalism and 
expressionism that once, in the West’s brilliant past, were the wellspring of 
economic dynamism and life itself.  
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Sola’s Lessons on Contemporary Corporatism: 
What Implications for the Great Slowdown and the Needed Reforms? 
 
by Edmund Phelps* 
 
It’s wonderful to be here at RAED again – and so soon! 
I will first say a word or two about Professor Juan Sola and his work on the 
meaning and the history of corporatism. And then, at his insistence, I will talk 
about corporatism in the context of the malaise of recent decades that has 
descended over the West and to discuss the possibility that corporatism has a lot 
to do with that malaise. 
Everything I know about the history of corporatism I have learned from 
Professor Sola, and much about corporatist theory as well. It was very 
illuminating to hear Professor Sola explain some years again at a presentation at 
Columbia that corporatism can be thought of as the opposite of individualism.14 
Today, I would like to offer my own understanding of the evolution of 
corporatism, though I think that Sola’s early point is fundamental.  
My early reading of corporatism 
Fairly early in my education, I ran into the famous encyclical of 1891 by Pope 
Leo XIII in which he regards companies as obligated to take care of their 
workers in various respects – in addition to paying the wages that are due. 15 
I think this encyclical stimulated the establishment in companies of a union of 
the workers that would communicate with the manager of the company.  
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Later, I came across the 1887 volume by Ferdinand Tönnies entitled 
Gemeinschaft und Gessellschaft, now known in English as Community and Civil 
Society.16  This Prussian sociologist was horrified by the damage caused to a 
community when new firms invade it. The widely read reprint in the early 1920s 
was one of the influences leading Germans to disempower German corporations 
and to try out an alternative to capitalism. 17 
I believe it is correct to say that the corporatists such as Tönnies and George 
Valois disapproved of disorder, such as the topsy-turvy disorder that came with 
the modern economy. They disapproved of the ambitions of those without 
wealth, calling them “money-grubbers,” and hated the new money that displaced 
established wealth. They also disapproved of competition, preferring instead 
what is called “solidarity,” which led to the doctrine of social protection. 
Most fundamentally, corporatists deplored individualism, calling for a state 
that would bring harmony and nationalism in place of the individual’s autonomy 
to take initiative and to innovate. Everyone is to go on working, accumulating 
wealth and running a company – that is all seen to be for the good of society. 
(Corporatism sanctions and even encourages materialism.) But no one is to be 
permitted to hire the nation’s labor and borrow its wealth in order to embark on a 
venture aimed at testing a new commercial idea – though, deep down, undertaken 
in the hope of succeeding at something and for the sheer thrill of voyaging into 
the unknown. Thus, corporatism was aimed at dismantling the modernism that 
was the root-source of the spirit of the dynamic economies emerging in the 50 
years between 1815 and 1870 and almost dying in the 50 years between 1968 or 
so and the present. (I like Steven Brill’s “50-year Fall.”) 
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Corporatism came into practice when Benito Mussolini became the Prime 
Minister of Italy in 1922.  Under his corporativismo, companies were under the 
considerable supervision and control of the state. A company did not have the 
freedom to risk its capital on a private venture that might cause damage here or 
there in rest of the economy.  
As for the Anglo Saxon countries, they exhibited incremental corporatism. It 
would be an exaggeration to say that they installed a corporatist system like those 
introduced by Germany and Italy. But in the 1930s, the American President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt organized each industry into a cartel that raised barriers 
against new enterprises and against competing through price reductions. In 
Britain, new entry into industries needed approval by the Federations of British 
Industry. 
After the Second World War, most economies in the West put the depression 
behind them. From the mid-40s to the mid-70s or even somewhat later, some of 
the institutions of corporatism were abolished or disempowered in America and 
Britain. Corporations could act without expecting any intervention from the 
government. Up to the mid-70s, it was widely thought to be a golden age.18-19 
Nevertheless, the unbridled capitalism from 1840 or so to 1930 or so has 
certainly come to an end by now: Since the mid-70s, there has been a 
groundswell of governmental administration for the purpose of implementing 
and regulating a somewhat corporatist economy. Donald Trump represents a 
more striking corporatism in which threats and actions are taken against 
particular companies or industry leader; and actions are taken to boost some 
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industries, such as the steel and auto industries. He is conducting the economy 
somewhat as Mussolini did.    
During this same time, there has been a steady reversion to traditional values: 
family values and community values and also some dogma from Medieval times 
– a company ought not to take actions that would harm others and a company 
that is failing ought to be rescued by the State. The property rights of corporation 
owners have been diluted, as employees and communities have been taught that 
they have a stake in what the company does and therefore a say.  The rise of a 
premodern culture of entitlement, self-importance, conformism, and dependence 
surely have led to a decline in vitalism – in wanting to “do things,” as Margaret 
Thatcher or Amartya Sen might call it. 
What I have found particularly interesting is the idea that came to be 
articulated in America by the 1980s that “if you work hard and play by the rules, 
you can earn your share of America’s blessings.”20  This strikes me as feudalist 
thinking: In this view, a person may think about his rewards the way a serf in a 
medieval manor might have felt. There is no recognition of the reward earned for 
individual initiative, creativity, intuitions and judgement – or even extraordinary 
effort.   
This is the way that people thought about their relationship to the economy 
when it was under a corporatist regime. And I think it is fair to say that the 
Western nations started to slide back to a kind of corporatist thinking sometime 
in the 1960s or 70s. The individual is not encouraged to break away from 
prevailing thinking. Children are not even expected to break away from home.21  
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Economic consequences of corporatism and medievalism 
This revival of elements from corporatism and medievalism has had costly 
consequences for the dynamism of economies.  Behind indigenous grassroots 
innovation is a spirit that indulges and encourages imagining, creating, venturing 
and exploring. I point to three elements that are critical to high dynamism in a 
nation: 
To have a broad flow of innovation, society has to allow businesses wide 
latitude to innovate: There is little leeway for innovations if society is unwilling 
to put up with the disruption or inconvenience that often accompanies 
innovation. In a corporatist society  there is a web of “social protection” 
hindering innovation. In this society, it is considered a right to say ‘no’ to 
outsiders with new ideas. A community is entitled to bar an airport or a shopping 
mall. The government may put up regulations that have the “latent function” of 
protecting established companies from the threat of innovative outsiders. 
Government contracts may have the same function. Companies may be free to 
operate a cartel that removes incentives to innovate in order to gain market share. 
22 (In the U.S., patent trolls and a climate of litigation pose daunting hazards for 
innovative start-ups.) 
How capable a nation is at innovating depends on its attitudes. Innovators 
tend to be people who question prevailing beliefs and think “outside the box.” 
There have to be financiers with enough experience to feel confident they can 
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Decline of Nations, Yale, 1982; James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, Yale, 1998; and Daron 
Acemogu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail, Crown, 2012. 
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judge well the innovative projects submitted to them. Aspiring innovators have to 
feel they have sufficient insight to warrant making a start.  In a corporatist 
society, a start-up entrepreneur would have to fear condemnation by society in 
the event the enterprise failed.  
At the heart of this dynamism is the desire to innovate – despite the obstacles 
or maybe in some part because of the obstacles. Some innovators have a deep 
need to act on the world. Others want to demonstrate to society that they can go 
their own way. Some others are driven by a need to prove to themselves that they 
can succeed. Obviously these motives and aspirations are not the work-and-save 
mentality of mercantile capitalism. 
These aspirations and motives were stirred by the modern values that began to 
emerge as early as the Renaissance: the individualism of Pico della Mirandola 
and Luther – “taking charge of one’s life,” which entails “thinking for oneself” 
and willingness to break from convention; the vitalism portrayed by Cellini, 
Cervantes and Shakespeare – relishing challenges, surmounting obstacles and 
making a mark; and the expressionism or experientialism of Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche – the fascination of venturing into unknown. These modern values 
steered people to pursue careers offering personal growth – the “becoming” of 
Montaigne and Bergson: As people created the new, they created themselves. 
These values were in sharp contrast to the traditional values of medieval or 
ancient times: materialist values that undermine exploration for its own sake; 
communitarian values that oppose new businesses and new money; and family 
values that impede breaking away and taking big chances. 
In all the discussion of reform, however, it is supposed that it is the 
“economy” that needs fixing – that the spirit of our country and thus the values 
that inspire it are still dominant. America is believed to remain at heart a nation 
13 
 
of pioneers and innovators, Europe the home of mythic explorers and profound 
discoverers. The corruption of government and of corporations is blamed on self-
interest, which can be outlawed. But these days, the self-interests and 
materialism that people have derive from their values. The transmutation of the 
state and business into something uninspiring and even unattractive is a result of 
a resurgence of the traditional values that we call corporatist values, which 
























XXX Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar  
Rome: June 25-27, 2018 
 
Diagnosing the Problem in Italy  
and Much of Western Europe 
 
Edmund Phelps* 
What are the deep, structural problems in Italy – the problems that stand in 
the way of a “good economy” – even if everything else goes right? The most 
critical problems, I would say, have to do with innovation, “indigenous” as 
well as “imported.” An innovative economy is generally necessary if people 
are to have ample opportunities to change jobs, a gratifying working life and 
rising living standards – though one kind of innovation worsens those 
problem for some on the way to solving the problem for most of the others. 
How has Italy fared in this dimension? 
Innovation in Italy. Long ago, several nations enjoyed an explosion of 
indigenous innovation (innovation originating within the nation and not 
imported from abroad), most of it replacing existing machines more than 
existing employees: America and Britain around 1820, France and Germany 
around 1870 – and Italy around 1950. By my calculation, Italy in that year 
ranked in 4th place in the big country rankings – as Italy pulled up and 
Germany fell back. (That surprised me because I understood the magnificent 
history compiled by Gianni Toniolo as concluding that the Italian economy 
had never attained what might qualify as sustained innovation at good rate.23) 
With that hugely fruitful innovation going on, these nations enjoyed a 
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“golden age” from 1950 to 1970: Real wages streaked ahead of wealth, 
leading to increased labor force participation; and the passion for new 
methods and products brought high job satisfaction and consumer 
satisfaction.24 (As the song goes, “I remember it well.” I remember the 
model-building we were all doing at the RAND Corporation, the 
Lamborghinis in the Wilshire showroom, the Beatles, the Boeing 707s – and 
much more.) 
But these good times were losing some of their shine. Estimates by 
Raicho Bojilov and I at the Center on Capitalism and Society show that 
indigenous innovation was gradually slowing in Italy as well as France over 
the postwar period; and it was much slower throughout the period in 
Germany than it had been in its heyday under Bismarck. 
Since 1970, there has been tumultuous structural change in the West: 
■ First, indigenous innovating has been markedly slower over the period 
from 1970 or so to the present in the U.S.– aside from the years of the 
internet boom – somewhat sooner in Italy and France; the U.K. too, though 
later on it had a good stretch. Declines of “imported” innovation in Italy and 
Spain can be laid in large part to the contraction in the supply of importable 
innovations that has been available to them in this post-1970 period – not by 
internal developments. These slowdowns have brought a major slowdown of 
total factor productivity and labor compensation, which has caused social 
discontent: They have thrown events into reverse: Wages lag more and more 
behind wealth, leading to decreased labor force participation, decreased job 
satisfaction and boredom borne of stagnation. 
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I suspect you are wondering whether there is any factual basis for these 
conclusions. My book Mass Flourishing – coming out in Italian from 
Rubbettino – points to evidence drawn from the World Values Surveys.25It 
shows that in 1990-91 the mean level of reported job satisfaction was very 
low in the countries suffering low levels of indigenous innovation – Italy and 
France, for example– and relatively high in countries with relatively high 
indigenous innovation – notably Switzerland, Denmark and America. Now 
the same research team has found evidence from 2008 data in the European 
Values Surveys that further supports this theory.26 It shows that among 13 
economically advanced Western European countries, those ranking lowest in 
reporting “high” or “somewhat high” job satisfaction– Spain, France and 
Italy – ranked very low in indigenous innovation as well (9th,  11th  and 13th 
respectively) and those ranking highest in job satisfaction –Switzerland and 
Denmark –  ranked very high in indigenous  innovation (in 2nd  place and 4th 
place, respectively). 
■ Second, and perhaps more serious over the near term, the losses of this 
innovation, made so fruitful because it was predominantly capital-saving, are 
now accompanied by gains of innovation coming from the “digital economy” 
– in the U.S. and many other countries too. And this new innovation is much 
more labor-saving. (Amazon and Microsoft are good examples, I think; 
perhaps Google is an example of capital-saving.) It has caused major job 
losses in the affected factories. In regions with many such job losses, there 
has been a wholesale withdrawal from the labor force: America’s Rust Belt 
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  The data are from the World Values Survey. See Mass Flourishing (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2013), pages 196 and 197. 
26  Data in the European Values Surveys are usually found in World Values Surveys but not in 
cases where American data to accompany them are not available. 
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in Appalachia and adjacent regions, Britain’s West Midlands and France’s 
Lorraine region. 
It is interesting that the countries which have always been regarded – 
historically, at any rate – as “innovation nations” – are the ones that have 
these distressed regions, while the countries that have always been regarded 
as “trading nations” – Germany and Holland, for example – have not been 
afflicted with such regions. I have to leave it up to you to decide whether 
Italy fits in the first group or the second.  
If Italy is suffering from the same rust belt phenomenon, then the country 
is in a double bind: There is less of the unambiguously good innovation and 
more of the problematic. 
You may be interested in knowing what I believe Italy and other countries 
must to do to reverse the decline of the good innovation. I have written some 
pages suggesting measures that state and society could take. The most 
thorough presentation is in the 8 ½ pages at the close of my book Mass 
Flourishing – pages 316 to 324. Society must cultivate in students and young 
people an eagerness and capability to innovate. Further, society must stop 
vested interests and corrupt officials from blocking or discouraging new 
product or methods – at least those not judged against the public interest. 
It is clear now that such a revitalization of the economy might have the 
“side effect” of giving a boost to the problematic innovation – the innovation 
that drives down wages to a lower growth path. As a Chinese proverb says: 
“Beware that you get your wishes!” Is there a way out of this conundrum? It 




In a couple of theoretical models that Hian Teck Hoon and I built over the 
past year or more, a single, purely labor-saving innovation – more precisely, 
a single innovation that adds a bunch of robots to workforces in the way a 
wave of immigration adds workers to workforces – would drive down the 
wage rate. But the resulting increase in the capital stock would pull the wage 
rate back up to where it had been before the robots came. And the bulge of 
profits on private capital and the rise of tax revenues appear to be enough to 
pull wage rates back up. Perhaps the lesson to draw is that the nation’s safest 
strategy is to take measures to slow the procession of robots that arrive to do 
the kind of work done by the humans. 
My conclusion from all this is that Italy as well as America, Britain and 
France must take all reasonable measures to boost the dynamism of their 
economies while they also take steps to ensure that the influx of technologies 
proceeds sufficiently slowly so that wage rates and employment of the 
affected workers can be cushioned through government compensation paid 
for out of the rising tax revenues. 
The euro, growth and employment I do think from time to time about other 
issues in the West. We have all being hearing for a very long time the 
contention that Italy has a serious problem with the euro – whether or not 
there is also a problem of deficient innovation that is independent of any 
currency problem. 
I think we should be skeptical about these claims. (My friend Stefano 
Micossi once commented to friends over dinner that I am skeptical about 
everything.) But it is impossible for the proponents – all of them highly 
reputable economists – to prove their claims beyond any doubt. So we should 
take seriously their arguments. 
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There is the slow recovery claim and the slow growth claim. The former 
claim is that Italy could depreciate its currency in pre-euro times and now it 
can’t. Of course, one of the arguments for the institution of a common 
currency was that it would put an end to devaluations and resulting inflations. 
(I heard other arguments from Robert Mundell and Tommaso Padoa Schiopa 
and later I had conversations with Dominick Salvatore.) One might wonder 
why the Italians are not grateful that the euro has averted the need for a 
catastrophic depreciation. 
The complaint against the euro that we hear is that the lack of a 
devaluation has been a drag on the speed of recovery in Italy after it hit 
bottom following the global financial crisis. The recent book by Mario 
Baldassarri, The European Roots of the Eurozone Crisis, is perhaps a 
definitive source.27 The data in FRED, a standard source of G7 data, show 
that Italy’s so-called employment rate, seasonally adjusted, climbed from its 
low in July 2010 of 56.6 % to 58.2 % in October 2017. That is a slow speed 
of recovery, to be sure. But if the euro is at fault, we should expect to see a 
poor result also in France and Spain. In France, the same employment rate 
climbed from its low of 63.9% in October 2010 to 65.2 % in October 2017. 
The speed of recovery there is also poor. But in Spain, the employment rate 
climbed from its low of 56.0 % in April 2012 to 61.6% in October 2017. This 
is a much faster speed of recovery. Some other countries in the Eurozone 
also show a relatively speedy recovery: Holland climbed fast from its low of 
64.5 % to 67.2 % and Portugal – bless its heart – has exploded from its 
bottom of 59.3 % to 68.9 %. Denmark also sprinted back to normal. 
Tentatively, I would lay all or most of Italy’s poor performance to structural 
causes. We do not know how Italy would have performed had it chosen to 
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  Mario Baladassarri, The European Roots of the Eurozone Crisis, (Palgrave, 2017). 
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operate with a flexible exchange rate. 
There is also a point of economic theory: Although Keynesian theory has 
a well-deserved place in understanding the initial employment effects of a 
contractionary shock, it is implausible to attribute a weakness of employment 
to a decrease of aggregate demand more than a dozen years ago. Nominal 
wages and prices ultimately adjust. Start-ups find openings. 
The slow growth claim is that the overvaluation of Italy’s currency has 
brought slower growth in Italy since the advent of the euro in 1999. I 
wonder: Is the euro the cause of that deceleration? My great colleague and 
dear friend, Joseph Stiglitz, points out that from 2000 to 2016 the eurozone 
GDP has shrunk noticeably relative to the US GDP – if my arithmetic is 
right, from 88.5% to 80.0%. But until 2005 or so, the US was enjoying the 
extraordinary rapid growth brought by the buildout of the internet. 
Furthermore, this relative shrinkage of the eurozone countries ought to be 
compared with what happened to the relative size from, say, 1985 to 2000. 
We need to recall that in the 1980s there was the deep “slump in Europe,” 
which Jean-Paul Fitoussi wrote about in our book The Slump in Europe:28 
The European slump was deeper and longer than the slump in the U.S., so 
Europe was losing ground in the ‘80s – long before the euro. And it lost still 
more ground in the 1990s when, as I noted, the US began to develop the 
internet. We called in the 2nd Great Depression! 
However, the heart of the matter is whether the euro is the cause of still 
slower productivity growth in Italy – and, by the same logic, France and 
Spain too. I would note that the estimates by Bojilov and me show gradual 
slowing of indigenous innovation in Italy in the ‘50s, again in the ‘70s and 
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again in the mid-‘90s – with no further slowing whatsoever after 1999 till the 
last year, 2011. 
I would interpret these preliminary findings as suggesting that real, not 
monetary, forces are at work in the West. I feel that future data will show 
even slower indigenous innovation in the U.S., the U.K. and France leading 
to a further slowdown of productivity and investment throughout the West. 
The increased weakness of investment and real wages is already apparent. 
In this crisis, it is disheartening to see the latest policy proposal: The 
government would pay something to young people not already employed 
provided they make themselves available to carry out tasks in the public 
sector. But that initiative would offer little of the rewards that people 
generally need and aspire to when possible. At the most basic level, adults 
need to feel that they are earning their way in the world – self-support, not 
public support. More important, carrying out tasks in the public sector, as 
children do chores, would not be a substitute for immersion in the heart of an 
enterprising economy. Most people, on growing up, need to be engaged in a 
central project of society: its economy. Most important, a meaningful career 
is essential for a gratifying life: to face challenges, to solve problems and to 
conceive better things. In On the Waterfront, Brando’s character says 
plaintively to his brother, “I could have been somebody…”29 We want badly 
to strive at succeeding at something. That, I say, was the American Dream.30 
If that is so, the West must address the need not for a new monetary 
system but for a revival of the spirit of innovation. That is crucial if the West 
is to regain the prospering and flourishing of its Golden Age. 
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  The writer of the screenplay was Budd Schulberg, the director Elia Kazan, score by Leonard 
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